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Sets of Frank sequences and Chu sequences are two classcs of 
polyphase sequence with ideal periodic autocorrelation functions, 
which at the same time have optimum crosscorrelation functions. 
In the Letter, the crosscorrelations of sets of combined FranWChu 
sequences, which contain a larger number of sequences than either 
of the two constituent sets, are considered. It is shown analytically 
that the crosscorrelations are similar to those of the original sets 
with one exception, while the autocomlations remain perfectly 
impulsive. 
Introduction: In code-division multiple-access (CDMA) communi- 
cation systems, in order to permit unambiguous message synchro- 
nisation, to minimise cochannel interference, and to support a 
large number of simultaneous users, large families of sequences 
with good autocorrelation functions (ACFs) and small c r o m r r e -  
lation function (CCF) values, are required. 
Frank sequences [I] and Chu sequences [2] are two classes of 
sequence with perfect ACFs and optimum CCFs. However, the 
number of Frank sequences and Chu sequences available for a 
given length L is relatively small. In this Letter we discuss the 
CCFs between any two sequences in combined FranWChu 
sequence sets which provides a larger family size. 
Properties of Frank and Chu sequence sets: Frank sequences F = 
U(!), . . .  f I,), . . . , f (vi)} are a class of polyphase sequence of length 
L = 4'. in which the qth roots of unity are the elements of the 
sequencefc" = u$J, f i ( ' 1 ,  .. ., fLI@J), i.e. 
where 0 r n r q2 - 1 and q is any integer. 
the sequence d') = (~$1, cl('), ..., cLl")) of length L are given by 
e t )  = o 5 n < L (r,  L )  = 1 (2) 
For Chu sequences C = (c"), .._, c('), ..., d L I J ) ,  the elements of 
It has been shown that the periodic ACFs and CCFs of Frank 
sequences and Chu sequences are given by [MI: 
T = O  (modL)  
T # O  (mod L) (3) 
L - 1  
n=O 
L-1 
L . r = O  ( m o d L )  
(7) = Cc)Cn+,  - 
*(') - { 0 7 # 0 (mod L) (5) 
n==O 
Periodic CCFs of sets of combined Frank/Chu sequences: To obtain 
a larger set of sequences, we define the following combined sets of 
FranUChu sequence: 
j7C = { f W ,  . . J'4, . . . , f iO, .  . . Jiq-1); 
. . . , &),. . , , &'), . . I ,  & I ) }  ( 7) 
where L = qz, (s, q) = 1, (s', q) = 1, (s - s', q) = 1, and (r, L) = 1, 
(r', L) = 1, (r - r', L) = 1. 
Obviously the ACFs of the sequences in the set are exactly the 
same as those of the original Frank sequences and Chu sequences. 
The CCF is equal to dL if both the sequences to be correlated are 
Frank sequences or both the sequences are Chu sequences. When 
one sequence is a Frank sequence and the other is a Chu sequence, 
then the CCF is calculated as shown below. 
Let n = j q  + k and T = uq + v, 0 r j ,  k, U, v r q - 1, then the 
integer n + T can be represented as 
TZ + T = ( j  + U + c)q  + ( k  + U - €4) (8) 
where E = 0, i fk  + v r q - 1, and E = 1, i fk  + v 2 q - 1. Let a = 
@q, then f?) = f,+pJ = a& c (4 = a r ( n + l ) n i % .  Thus 
I "  
R&l , f < e 1 ( 7 )  
S=O n=O 
q-1  q-1 
= , ~ . ( I P + k ) ( J P + k + l ) / 2 s , - a ( 3 + ~ + ~ ) ( k + ~ - ~ q )  
k=O 3=0 








The last equality is valid because afeq = 1, c is any integer, and 
a/a = e-J1 = ( - l p  = (-1YJ = arJqi2. Let 1 = (rq)/2 + rk + r/2 - sk - 
sv; the above inner sum is equal to zero, if I re 0, and is equal to q, 
if I = 0. The equation I = 0 (mod q) has a unique solution ko = [SY 
- r(l + q)/2u(r - s) if r re s (mod q). That is 
0 k # k - sW-- r ( l+q) /2  2 , i (?+rk+$-sk -su)  - 0 - 7-s 
8 Y - T  1 + q ) / 2  q k = k o =  >-s 
(10) 
pc(*l,fl,l(T)~ = I,~ko(ko+l)/2u-~iu+.)(ko+u)pl = = & 
(11) 
J=o - {  
Therefore, if r re s (mod 4). we have 
For r = s (mod q), the CCFs between Frank sequences and Chu 
sequences are given by 
R C ( s i - h ~ l , f ( a 1  (7) 
where h = 0, 1, ..., q - 1 and 
Hence 
As an example, the combined FranHChu sequences of length 25 
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are 
FG = ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ , ~ ~ ~ j , ~ ~ ~ ~ , ~ ~ ~ ~ ; c ~ i ~ , c ~ ~ ~ , c ~ ~ ~ , c ~ ~ j j  (15) 
The CCFs between any two sequences, I?,(,) , ,(s) (T), R,+I , R,+) (T) 
and R,c,) , /(SI (T) (r i s mod 5), are constant and equal to 5. For r 
= s mod 5, the CCFs, R J ~ )  , fi) (T), are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1: CCFs of combined FranWChu sequences ( L  = 25, r = s 
mod 5) 
Conclusions: The CCFs between Frank sequences and Chu 
sequences are considered in this Letter. It is proved that RA,) , 
(T) = qL when r i s (mod q). Although there exist some time shifts 
where the CCF values are relatively large (when r = s (mod q)), in 
this case, the CCFs are zero for all other time shifts include those 
around the zero time shift position. 
It should be noted that the methods presented here can also 
apply to generalised Frank sequences [3] and generalised Chu 
sequences [4]. 
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Improved identity-based key sharing 
system for multiaddress communication 
C.-S. Laih and W.-C. Kuo 
Indexing term: Information theory, Cryprosystem, Discrete 
logarithm problem, El-GamalS public-key cryptosystem 
Introduction: Since Shamir [l] proposed the concept of identity- 
based (ID-based) cryptosystems, many realisable schemes for ID- 
based cryptosystems and key sharing systems have been proposed. 
One of the earliest concrete ID-based cryptosystems using the dis- 
crete logarithm problem was proposed by Tsujii et al. [2]. How- 
ever, if n entities conspire then the n secret pieces of information 
of the trusted centre (TC) in their scheme can be disclosed. To 
improve the security, a modified version of the above scheme was 
developed by Laih and Lee [3]. However, it was shown that the 
modified version can be completely broken by the conspiracy of (n 
+ 1) entities with overwhelming probability [4]. In 1990, Chika- 
zawa and Inoue proposed an ID-based key sharing system [5] 
whose key preparation in TC is an improvement of [2]. Shimbo 
and Kawamura, however, developed an attack (the &called SK 
attack) to show that the scheme is not secure when it is used for 
conference key distribution [6]. An improved version was then 
proposed by Chikazawa and Yamagishi [A to counter the SK 
attack. In the improved ID-based key sharing system, the key 
preparation in TC is the same as the original scheme and it allows 
entities to use different random numbers to counter the SK attack. 
In this Comment, we show that even though the improved ID- 
based key sharing system can resist the SK attack, the improved 
scheme as well as the original scheme can be completely broken by 
the conspiracy of (n + 1) entities with overwhelming probability. 
Key preparation by TC in [5, 71: The key preparation by the centre 
in the ID-based key sharing systems [5 ,  71 is the same as the RSA 
scheme. The TC first chooses (e,  N) as its public information and 
calculates d satisfying 
e . d = l  (modL)  
as its secret information, where L = I a n @  - 1,  q - 1) and p and q 
are two distinct primes. To calculate the secret information for the 
entities in the system, the centre also generates n-dimensional vec- 
tors 
and 
G = (go’ mod N, gaz mod N, . . . , gan mod N) 
where g is an integer which is a primitive element in both Gkyp) 
and Gflq). Suppose that entity i has the identification information 
IDj and every entity in the system can easily generate the k-dimen- 
sional vector of entity i 
a = (a1,az.. ‘ . , a n )  1 5 a, 5 L - 1 (1 5 i 5 n )  
Ii=(z,1,2i2,”’,z&) zirE{0,1} ( l < l l k < n )  
f(IJ = (Y%l,Yiz,“’,Y%n) Y.1 E {0,1) (1 51 5 n)  
and n-dimensional vector 
wherefO is a one-to-one one-way function. Then, for entity i, the 
centre computes (U;, v,, s,) satisfying 
U, = a. f(Ii) (mod L)  = xa,y,, (mod L )  (1) 
3=1 
U,. U, 1 (mod L )  (2) 
s, =ID: (mod N) (3) 
and sends (v,,  s,) to entity i as its secret information. The main dif- 
ference of the key preparation by the TC between the ID-based 
key sharing systems [5, and ID-based cryptosystems [2, 31 is that 
the centre in [5, 7] sends v, as one of the secret pieces of informa- 
tion of entity i instead of U,. If the centre sends U ,  as one of the 
secret pieces of information of entity i, then it can be shown that 
the centre secret information a and L can be completely disclosed 
by the conspiracy of (n + 1) entities with Overwhelming probabil- 
ity [4]. Because qcannot be derived from v, without knowing L it 
seems that the centre secret information a and L cannot be com- 
puted when (n + 1) entities conspire. However, as shown in the 
following, the ID-based key sharing system as well as the 
improved version can be completely broken by the conspiracy of 
(n + 1) entities with overwhelming probability even if they can 
resist the SK attack. 
Attack: The goal of this attack is to find the centre secret informa- 
tion a = (a, ,  a2, ..., a.) and L by using the (n + l) entities’ secret 
information v, and the common public information. From eqn. 1, 
we have 
(4) 
Eqn. 4 can be rewritten as 
. .  (mod L) . .  . .  . .  
(5) 
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